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THE CONGRESSIONAL IMPEACHMENT POWER AS IT RELATES
TO THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
Bethel B. Kelley* and Daniel G. Wyllie**
I.

Introduction

The United States Constitution, article III, § 1, provides that "The Judges,
both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour .... " Article II, § 4, provides that "The President, Vice President,
and all civil Officers-of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors." The relationship of these provisions has been the subject of
much controversy in virtually every impeachment proceeding brought against a
federal judge which has resulted in a Senate trial. The purpose of this article is
to trace the development of this controversy and to attempt to delineate the exact
nature- of the impeachment power as it relates to the federal judiciary.' The
problem basically involves the definition of an impeachable offense. The basic
source material for such a determination is, first, the Constitution itself, second,
the debates of Congress in interpretation of that power, third, the application of
the constitutional provision in the nine impeachment proceedings involving the
federal judiciary, and fourth, the comments of scholars who have analyzed the
problem.
Before an extensive examination of the debates is made, a brief review of
the various impeachment proceedings resulting in a Senate trial of a federal judge
is in order. The first impeachment of a federal judge, and the first impeachment
to succeed, was that of John Pickering, United States District Judge for the
District of New Hampshire. Judge Pickering was charged with the violation of a
United States statute by wrongfully releasing a vessel which had been seized by
the government without requiring the prescribed indemnity bond. He was also
charged with conducting court while intoxicated and with blasphemy on the
bench. Judge Pickering did not respond to the articles of impeachment but his
son did and was allowed to introduce testimony to show that the judge was
mentally irresponsible. The Senate convicted the judge on each of the articles and
removed him from office on March 12, 1804.2
On the same day, the House of Representatives voted to impeach Samuel
Chase, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, on eight articles.' He was charged
with certain misconduct to the prejudice of impartial justice in the course of a
* Member, State Bar of Michigan; A.B., University of Michigan, 1934; J.D., University
of Michigan, 1937; partner, Dykema, Gossett, Spencer, Goodnow & Trigg, Detroit, Michigan.
** Member, State Bar of Michigan; A.B., Wayne State University, 1967; J.D., Wayne
State University, 1969; associated with Dykema, Gossett, Spencer, Goodnow & Trigg, Detroit,
Michigan.
1 For an examination of the nature of the impeachment process and the four major
misconceptions which have arisen in connection with it, see Ford, Impeachment- A Mace for
the Federal Judiciary, 46 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 669 (1971).
2 12 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 642 (1803) [1802-1803]; 13 ANNALS OF CONORSS 367
(380,J),
81803-1804.
3
(1804) [1803-1804].
3 13 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 1180-81
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trial for sedition, with misconduct in improperly inducing or coercing a grand
jury to return an indictment against an editor of a newspaper for an alleged
breach of the sedition laws, and with misconduct in addressing an inflammatofy
harangue to a grand jury. In the course of the trial an extensive debate was had
concerning the nature of the impeachment power. The impeachment failed for
want of a two-thirds majority even though a-majority voted to convict on several
of the articles.'
James H. Peck, judge of the United States District Court for the District'of
Missouri, was impeached in 1830 on one general article, 5 containing eighteen
specifications, charging abuse of official power and arbitrary conduct in severely
punishing for contempt of court an attorney who had published a criticism of
one of the judge's opinions. In his answer, the judge alleged that his conduct was
legally correct and justifiable. He also denied the existencd of a malicious motive.
The trial resulted in a majority of the Senate voting against impeachment0
In 1862 Judge West H. Humphries was impeached and convicted for
activities relating to the secession of Tennessee and 'for serving as a Confederate
judge.' Judge Humphries did not appear to defend the articles and was removed
by a unanimous vote of the Senate.8
The next impeachment affecting the judiciary was that of Charles Swayne,
United States District Judge for Florida.9 In 1904 Judge Swayne was impeached
on twelve articles, charging that he had rendered false claims in his expense accounts; that he had appropriated to his own use, without making compensations
therefor, a certain railroad car belonging to a defunct railroad company, then
in the hands of a receiver appointed by the judge; that he had resided outside
of his judicial district in violation of the statute; and that he had maliciously
adjudged certain parties to be in contempt of court and had imposed excessive
punishments upon them. The judge defended, and was acquitted by a majority
on each
In article.'
1912 the House of Representatives impeached Robert W. Archbald,
United States Circuit Judge for the Commerce Court, upon thirteen articles."
The articles charged the judge with the use of his official power and influence
to secure business favors and concessions. He was also charged with various
misconduct while a 'district court judge but was acquitted thereon, apparently
because the Senate did not wish to set, a precedent of impeaching a person for
acts occurring while in a former office.' The judge was found guilty on five of
thirteen articles and removed from office. 3
In 1926 George W. English, United States District Judge from Illinois, was
impeached by the House of Representatives."' He was charged with an abuse of
4
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power in the suspension and disbarment of two attorneys and for using his office
for personal gain by appointing a personal friend as the sole bankruptcy referee
for his court. The charges against Judge English were dropped after he resigned
from office. 5
In 1933 Harold Louderback, United States District Judge from California,
was impeached by the House of Representatives. 6 The articles charged the judge
with using his office for the enrichment of his personal friends and political allies.
He had appointed them as receivers even though no receiver should have been appointed and though the persons appointed did not qualify. Judge Louderback
was acquitted on all articles. 7
The last impeachment proceeding was brought in 1936 against Halsted L.
Ritter, United States District Judge for Florida.' Of the seven articles of impeachment, the first six alleged specific instances of wrongdoing on the part of
Judge Ritter involving the use of his office for personal gain, including the receipt
of "kickbacks" from legal fees he awarded to his former law partner. Judge
Ritter was acquitted on all six of these articles." The seventh article was a recitation of the first six and charged the judge with bringing his office into disrespect
by his questionable conduct. On this article, Judge Ritter was convicted and
removed from office. " As will be noted later, the Ritter case is one of the most
enlightening because it was the only trial in which individual Senators filed
written opinions expressing the reasons for their votes.
II.

The Precedents

The impeachment trial of Judge Pickering affords little precedential value
because of the tragic circumstances under which he was impeached and because
he did not actually defend himself at the trial. However, a minor debate took
place over the form of the question to be put to the Senate. Some Senators
insisted that they should be asked whether the judge was guilty of "high Crimes
and Misdemeanors." They took the position that the Senate must first determine
whether the facts alleged in the articles of impeachment were true, and then
decide whether they constituted impeachable offenses. However, a majority of the
Senate decided that the question should be merely whether the judge was guilty
as "charged."'" Although this form of question was used in subsequent impeachment trials, little emphasis has been placed on the fact that it implies that the
Senate is not limited to removal by impeachment for "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" only.
The first extensive debate concerning the nature of the impeachment power
occurred during the trial of Justice Chase. In that case, counsel for Chase stoutly
maintained that impeachment would only lie for "indictable offenses." Counsel
for Chase advanced three major arguments in support of this proposition. The
15
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first contention was that the very definition of the words "high Crimes and
Misdemeanors" means an "indictable offense." As Luther Martin, a member of
the Constitutional Convention, said on behalf of Justice Chase:
There can be no doubt but that treason and bribery are indictable
offenses. We have only to inquire, then, what is meant by high crimes and
misdemeanors? What is the true meaning of the word "crime?" It is the
breach of some law which renders the person who violates it liable to punishment. There can be no crime committed where no such law is violated.
Thus, it appears, crimes and misdemeanors are the violation of a law,
exposing the person to punishment, and are used in contradistinction to
those breaches of law, which
are mere private injuries, and only entitle the
22
injured to a civil remedy.
The second assertion made in support of the proposition that impeachable
offenses must be "indictable" was that all the provisions of the Constitution relating to impeachment are couched in the terminology of the criminal laws.
Thus, a civil officer must be "convicted of... high crimes and misdemeanors." 23
"The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury."24 "No
person shall be convicted [of impeachment] without the concurrence of twothirds of the members present."'2 5 These clauses of the Constitution, argued
counsel for Chase, support the principle that impeachment is in effect a criminal
prosecution which cannot be maintained without the proof of some indictable
offense of the laws.26
The third point raised by Chase's counsel was that the framers of the Constitution intentionally restricted impeachment to indictable offenses to safeguard
the independence of the judiciary. A judge must be free to decide the cases before
him based on his own conscience without having to fear impeachment because
two-thirds of the Senate disagree with him. It should be noted that the impeachment of Justice Chase was apparently motivated, to a large degree, by political
factors. Justice Chase was a Federalist who had incurred the wrath of the Jeffersonian Republicans by many of his rulings. His counsel contended that the
stability and integrity of the Supreme Court demanded a strict interpretation of
the impeachment clause. As one of his counsel stated in the debate:
I have considered these observations on the necessary independence of
the Judiciary applicable and important to the case before this honorable
court, to repel the wild idea that a judge may be impeached and removed
from office although he has violated no law of the country, but merely on the
vague and changing opinions of right and wrong-propriety and impropriety
of demeanor. For if this is to be the tenure on which a judge holds his office
and character, if by such a standard his judicial conduct is to be adjudged
27
criminal or innocent, there is an end to the independence of our Judiciary.
22 14 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 81, 432 (1804) [1804-1805].
23 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
24 U.S. CoNST.art. III, § 2.
25 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
26 14 ANNALS OF CoNGRESS 81,505-14 (1804) [1804-1805].
27 Id. at 363-64.
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In response to the position advanced by the counsel for Chase, the House
managers contended that impeachable offenses are not -limited to indictable
crimes. They argued that the Constitution, in restricting punishment for impeachment to removal from and disqualification for office, makes a distinction
between "indictable" offenses and "impeachable" offenses. Insofar as the conduct of a judge is injurious to society because it is an abuse of the office he holds,
it is impeachable. Insofar as the conduct is criminal in nature, it may be indictable and punishable under the criminal law.28 The managers also contended
that the Justice, by violating his oath of office to be fair and impartial in the administration of justice, committed an impeachable offense.29
The most illuminating argument advanced by the House managers is that a
judge may be impeached for misbehavior without resort to the impeachment
provisions in article II, § 4. Manager Nicholson pointed out that:
The Constitution declares, that "the judges both of the supreme and
inferior courts shall hold their commissions during good behavior." The
plain and correct inference to be drawn from this language is, that a judge
is to hold his office so long as he demeans himself well in it; and whenever
he shall not demean himself well, he shall be removed. I therefore contend that a judge would be liable to impeachment under the Constitution, even without the insertion of that clause which declares, that
"all civil officers of the United States shall be removed for the commission of
treason, bribery, and other high crimes and misdemeanors." The nature of
the tenure by which a judge holds his office is such that, for any act of misbehavior in office, he is liable to removal. These acts of misbehavior may be
of various kinds, some which may, indeed, be punishable under our laws by
indictment, but there may be others which the law-makers may not have
pointed out, involving such a flagrant breach of duty in a judge, either by
doing that which he ought not to have done, or in omitting to do that which
he ought to have done, that no man of common understanding would
hesitate to say he ought to be impeached for it.3
According to this argument, the tenure provision of the Constitution draws
a distinction between judges and other civil officers. Both judges and other civil
officers may be impeached for "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." But judges may also be impeached for misbehavior. This additional
ground for impeachment is required in the case of judges because of their life
tenure while other civil officers are subject to periodic removal for misbehavior
through the ballot box. This contention also relies on a construction of the impeachment provision. Article II, § 4, provides that "civil Officers ... shall be
removed .... " (Emphasis added.) Thus, it is a mandatory but not a restrictive
provision. It leaves the power in the Congress to determine what, if any, other
offenses or conduct is impeachable. This argument is important because it supplies the basis for other arguments which were raised in subsequent impeachment
proceedings.
Although Justice Chase was acquitted, it cannot be said that his trial set a
precedent that only indictable offenses are impeachable. It is impossible to
28
29
30

Id. at 331-32.
Id. at 608-10.
Id. at 563.
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determine upon which factors the vote of an individual Senator turned. A vote
for acquittal could have meant that the facts charged were not proven or that the
facts proven did not constitute an impeachable offense. Unquestionably, some
votes also were politically motivated. However, at least one commentator stated
that:
[A] precedent was established to the effect that the judges are not to be
removed from office because of the content of -their decisions or because of
unusual or offensive mannerisms. Removal from office is in order only for
serious misconduct, [or] charges bordering on the criminal."The proposition that an impeachable offense need not be "indictable" was
assumed to have been settled by all parties in the trial of Judge Peck in 1830.
The managers for the House of Representatives defined an impeachable offense
on the part of a judge as follows:
A judicial misdemeanor consists... in doing an illegal act, colore officii, with
bad motives, or in doing an act within the competency of the court or judge
in a particular case from the, facts existing in
in some cases, but unwarranted
32
that case, with bad motives.
Former President Buchanan, then a member of the House of Representatives, stated in the course of argument that misbehavior on the part of a judge is
a forfeiture of the office. He conceded that the Chase trial settled that the judicial
misbehavior must consist of a violation of the Constitution or some known law of
the land, but it need not be "indictable" because misbehavior could consist in the
abuse of a power granted to the judge, such as the contempt power, as well as in
the usurpation of authority."
Counsel for Peck did not dispute this position, but argued that the abuse of
official power must have been intentional.' Their position was that a mere mistake on the part of the judge as to what his powers were could not constitute an
impeachable offense. They claimed that a judge must act with the knowledge
that he was violating the law in order to commit an impeachable offense." Since
*the discussion of the power of impeachment in the Peck case was merely preliminary, with the main force of the arguments going to the question of law in
regard to the right of the judge to punish for contempt and the question of fact
as to his intention, the Peck trial added little definition to the precise nature of
the impeachment power.
The major point of debate during the impeachment trial of Judge Swayne
in 1904 was whether a judge could be impeached for misconduct not directly
related to his judicial duties. As noted earlier, none of the misconduct charges
against Judge Swayne took place while he was actually holding court. His counsel
argued that all previous impeachments, both English and American, conclusively
established that impeachment would lie only for misconduct in the exercise of the31 Blackmar, On the Removal of Judges: The Impeachment Trial of Samuel Chase, 48 J.
Am. Jun. Soc'Y 183, 184 (1964).
32 3 HIND'S PRECEDENTS OF THE HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES 798 (1907).
33 Id. at 800.
34

Id. at 802.
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office since none had ever involved the personal misbehavior of a judge. Their
position rested on the proposition that the term "high Crimes and Misdemeanors"
was a term of art which must be construed in light of English parliamentary
usage. 5 As counsel for Swayne stated:
In English and American parliamentary and constitutional law the judicial
misconduct which rises to the dignity of a -high crime and misdemeanor must
consist of judicial acts, performed with an evil or wicked intent, by a judge
while administering justice in a court, either between private persons or
between a private person and the government of the State. All personal misconduct of a judge, occurring during his tenure of office and not coming
within that category, must be classed among the offenses for which a judge
may be removed by address, a method of6a removal which the framers of our
Constitution refused to embody therein.8 (Emphasis added.)
The reference to "removal by address" referred to a practice used in
England. In England, impeachment had a much broader scope since it could be
used against any subject of the king and the penalty was not restricted to removal
from office. A majority of both houses of Parliament could request the king to
remove an official without convicting him of impeachment. Counsel for Swayne
contended that the refusal to adopt this method of removal showed that the impeachment power was intended to be restricted to "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" committed in an official capacity. Counsel pointed out that "removal by
address" was deliberately left out of the Constitution "with a view of giving
stability to those who hold the offices, especially the judges. 317 Counsel for
Swayne placed emphasis on the fact that during the Constitutional Convention,
Randolph opposed the motion to include "removal by address" because it would
weaken too much the independence of the judges. 8 Counsel also argued that the
substitution of the term "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" in article II, § 4, for
the original term "maladministration" added further proof of an intentional
restriction of the impeachment power.3 9
In the Swayne case, the managers for the House of Representatives contended that the Constitution was not intended to restrict impeachment to conduct
directly related to the official duties of a judge. They referred to the absurdity of
holding that a judge who had been convicted and imprisoned for murder could
not be impeached because his conduct did not occur while on the bench.4
Instead, the managers submitted that the Constitution gave Congress the power
to impeach a judicial officer for any misbehavior that showed disqualification to
hold and exercise the office, whether moral, intellectual or physical, since the
judicial tenure is expressly conditioned upon the good behavior of the judge.4
The House managers in the Swayne trial again advanced an argument
which had been raised in the Chase trial. They contended that article I, §§ 2
and 3, which give the House and Senate the sole impeachment power are merely
35
36
37
38
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40
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jurisdictional and not definitional clauses. Article II, § 4, they said, is a mandatory provision directing Congress to remove those officers who are convicted of
treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. The managers stated
that there may be other offenses for which an officer may be impeached. Article
III, § 1, provides a definition of such additional grounds in the case of the
judiciary, i.e., misdemeanor. 2 The managers concluded that[O]ur fathers adopted a Constitution under which official malfeasance and
nonfeasance, and, in some cases, misfeasance, may be the subject of impeachment, although not made criminal by act of Congress, or so recognized by
the common law of England, or of any State of the Union. They adopted
impeachment as a means of removing men from office whose misconduct
imperils the public safety and renders them 4unfit
to occupy official position.
3
All American text writers support this view.

Indeed, the textual authorities have in fact unanimously rejected the
position that a "high Crime or Misdemeanor" must be an "indictable" offense
before an impeachment will lie. As was stated by Roger Foster:
The Constitution provides that "the judges, of both the Supreme and
inferior courts, shall hold their office during good behavior." This necessarily implies that they may be removed in case of bad behavior. But no
means, except impeachment, is provided for their removal, and judicial
misconduct is44not indictable by either a statute of the United States or the
common law.

George Curtis looked to the purpose of the impeachment power in this
statement:
The purposes of an impeachment lie wholly beyond the penalties of the
statute or the customary law. The object of the proceeding is to ascertain
whether cause exists for removing a public officer from office. Such a cause
may be found in the fact that, either in the discharge of his office or aside
from its functions, he has violated a law, or committed what is technically
denominated a crime. But a cause for removal from office may exist, where
no offense against positive law has been committed, as when the individual
has, from immorality or imbecility or maleadministration [sic] become unfit
to exercise the office. 45
As was stated in the American and English Encyclopedia of Law:
The cases, then, seem to establish that impeachment is not a mere mode of
procedure for the punishment of indictable crimes; that the phrase "high
crimes and misdemeanors!' is to be taken, not in its common law, but in its
42
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broader parliamentary sense, and is to be interpreted in the light of parliamentary usage; that in this sense it includes not only crimes for which an
indictment may be brought, but grave political offenses, corruptions, maladministration, or neglect of duty involving moral turpitude, arbitrary and oppressive conduct, and even gross improprieties,by judges and high officers of
state, although such offenses be not of a character to render the offender
(Emliable to an indictment either at common law or under any statute.
phasis added.)
Although many excellent arguments were raised by both sides in the Swayne
trial, it cannot be conclusively stated which position carried the day. Judge
Swayne's acquittal could have been due to the fact the Senate thought that
impeachable misconduct must be directly related to the office or that the facts
charged were not proven, or even that the judge's proven conduct, although impeachable, did not warrant removal from office. However, it is difficult to
understand how the Senate could have adopted the first position because of its
obvious result in leaving no remedy as to removal of a judge who has been imprisoned by a state or federal court for crimes committed in his personal life,
totally unrelated to his office or judicial duties.
The 1912 impeachment trial in which Judge Robert W. Archbald was
found guilty was the first proceeding resulting in removal in which the nature of
the impeachment power was extensively debated. In adopting the articles of
impeachment, the House of Representatives took the position that a breach of
judicial "good Behaviour," regardless of its criminality, was impeachable. The
Chairman of the Impeachment Committee conceded that none of the articles
would sustain a criminal charge.4 7 The Chairman of that committee stated the
charges as follows: "From 1908 to the present time we have shown that he has
been acting improperly and violating good judicial ethics by prostituting his
official position for personal profit and otherwise."4
In the Senate, counsel for the judge adhered to the argument which had
been made previously on the part of the counsel for Justice Chase that an impeachable offense must be, by the very terms of the Constitution, an indictable
offense, or at the very least, must have the characteristics of a crime. They attempted to sustain this proposition, as did counsel for Chase, by referring to the
fact that the impeachment power throughout the Constitution is couched in the
terminology of the criminal law.49
On the other hand, the House managers advanced several theories to prove
that nonindictable judicial misbehavior was impeachable. The broadest of these
theories was that the Constitution left the definition of "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" and judicial "good Behaviour" to Congress, placing no restrictions
on the impeachment power except to limit its use to civil officers and its punishment to removal and disqualification from office. As Manager Sterling said in his
final argument:
46
47
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And so, Mr. President, I say, that outside of the language of the Constitution, which I quoted, there is no law which binds the Senate in this
case to-day except that law which is prescribed by their own conscience, and
on that, and on that alone, must depend the result of this trial. Each
Senator must fix his own standard; and the result of this trial depends upon
whether or not these offenses we have charged against Judge Archbald
come within the law laid down by the conscience of each Senator himself.50
In rebutting the argument that conduct to be impeachable must be indictable, the managers pointed to the object of the impeachment power. Impeachment, they said, is not intended to punish the individual but rather to protect the
public "from injury at the hands of their own servants and to purify the public
service."'" Thus, according to this argument, a federal judge should be removed
"whenever, by reason of misbehavior, misconduct, malconduct, or maladministration, the judge has demonstrated his unfitness to continue in office ...,,2
The managers also advanced the theory based upon a construction of the
judicial tenure provision [article III, § 1] and: the removal provision [article II, §
4]. It must be assumed that the two provisions were not intended to be mutually
antagonistic. Therefore, the judicial tenure provision is of necessity either an
addition to the enumerated offenses of the removal section or a definition of "high
Crimes and Misdemeanors" as applied to ihe judiciary to include misbehavior.
Any other interpretation would destroy the effect of the "good Behaviour" clause
which would be a violation of the basic rule of constitutional construction which
gives full effect to all words. 53 Thus, the managers contended that the Constitution adopted one standard for the judiciary and another for all other civil officers,
saying:
In other words, our forefathers in framing the Constitution have wisely seen
fit to provide for requisite of holding office on the part of a judge that does
not apply to other civil officers. The reason for this is apparent. The President, Vice President, and other civil officers, except judges, hold their positions for a definite fixed-term, and any misbehaving in office on the part of
any of them can be rectified by the people or the appointing power when
the term of office expires. But the judge has no such tenure of office. He is
placed beyond the power of the people or the appointing power, and is
therefore subject only 'to removal for misbehavior. Since he cannot be
removed unless he be impeached by the House of Representatives, tried and
convicted by the Senate, it must necessarily follow that misbehavior in office
is an impeachable offense.54 (Emphasis added:)
In rebutting an argument that the independence bf the judiciary demands a
strict interpretation of the Constitution, the managers replied that the Constitution was not meant to establish an irresponsible judiciary. The office is a public
trust and someone must determine whether that trust has been abused. The Constitution required that Congress make the determination. The managers said:
50
51
52
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In requiring first of all a majority of the House of Representatives in order
to prefer articles of impeachment and then two-thirds of the Members of
the Senate present to convict, they hedged the power about with all the
safeguards necessary to protect the upright official and yet leave it sufficient
play to preserve the public welfare.55
In summation, the managers submitted that a judge ought to be removed
when his acts are "calculated with absolute certainty to bring the court into
public obloquy and contempt and to seriously affect the administration of
justice."5 6
In commenting on the outcome of the Archbald trial, one of the House
managers subsequently wrote:
[I]t will be observed that none of the articles exhibited against Judge Archbald charged an indictable offense or even a violation of positive law.
Indeed, most of the specific acts proved in evidence were not intrinsically
wrong, and would have been blameless if committed by a private citizen.
The case rested on the alleged attempt of the respondent to commercialize
his potentiality as a judge, but the facts would not have been sufficient to
support a prosecution for bribery. Therefore, the judgment of the Senate
in this case has forever removed from the domain of controversy the proposition that the judges are only impeachable for the commission of crimes or
misdemeanors against the laws of general application.5 7 (Emphasis added.)
During the trial of Judge Harold Louderback, all parties agreed that the
Archbald impeachment did so settle the question. In fact, counsel for Judge
Louderback expressly adopted the position that the judicial tenure provision
implies that a judge may be impeached for a breach of good behavior:
The Constitution of this country provides that an appointment of this
kind is for life, depending on good behavior. So I have concluded, and I
respectfully submit to you, that "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" so far as
this proceeding is concerned, means anything which is bad behavior, anything
which is not good behavior. 58
Judge Louderback's defense basically was that his conduct was not intrinsically
wrong and did not amount to impeachable misbehavior.
In attempting to define what constituted impeachable misbehavior, the
House managers pointed to the defensive nature of the impeachment power.
Since it was not a punitive measure, the criminal law standard of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt need not be met.59 Rather, if it be proven that a judge's
conduct cast substantial doubt on the integrity of the judiciary, he has committed
impeachable misbehavior:
55

Id. at 1267.

56

Id. at 1266.

57 Brown, The Impeachment of the Federal Judiciary 26 HARV. L. Rav. 684, 704-05

(1913).
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[T]he duty of the Senate... is to protect the Federal judiciary and to protect
the people against those persons connected with the judiciary whose conduct
arouses doubt as to their honesty. .

.

. From an examination of the whole

history of impeachment and particularly as it relates itself to our system of
government, when the facts proven with reference to a respondent are such
as are reasonably calculated to arouse a substantial doubt in the minds of the
people over whom that respondent exercises authority, that he is not brave,
candid, honest, and true, there is no other alternative than to remove such
a judge from the bench, because wherever doubt resides confidence cannot
be present. It is not in the nature of free government that the people must
submit to the government of a man as to whom they have substantial doubt.60
In the last impeachment trial held, that of Judge Halsted L. Ritter in 1936,
the managers of the House of Representatives reiterated the position asserted in
the trial of Judge Louderback. The managers insisted that conduct on the part
of a federal judge which casts doubts as to his integrity constitutes impeachable
misbehavior. Their position was that the public confidence in the judiciary
demands a strict standard of judicial conduct. Manager Summers said in final
argument as to the meaning of "good Behaviour":
It means obey the law, keep yourself free from questionable conduct,
free from embarrassing entanglements, free from acts which justify suspicion,
hold in clean hands the scales of justice. That means that he shall not take
chances that would tend to cause the people to question the integrity of the
court, because where doubt enters, confidence departs.... When a judge on
the bench, by his own conduct, arouses a substantial doubt as to his judicial
integrity he commits the highest crime that a judge can commit under the
Constitution. It is not essential to prove guilt. There is nothing in the Constitution and nothing in the philosophy of a free government that holds that
a man shall continue to occupy office until it can be established beyond a
reasonable doubt that he is not fit for the office. It is the other way. When
there is, resulting from the judge's conduct, a reasonable doubt as to his
integrity he has no right to stay longer.61
Since Judge Ritter was convicted by the Senate and since the counsel for the
judge did not dispute the standard applied but attempted to prove that the
judge's conduct was proper, it is reasonable to conclude that the Senate, in a
relatively contemporaneous trial, has adopted this standard for impeachment of
a federal judge. In this connection it is important to note that Judge Ritter was
acquitted on the first six articles which accused him of specific acts of wrongdoing.
His conviction and removal were based on article seven which charged that:
The reasonable and probable consequence of the actions or conduct of
Halsted L. Ritter... since he became judge of said court, as an individual or
as such judge, is to bring his court into scandal and disrepute, to the prejudice of said court and public confidence in the administration of justice
therein, and to the prejudice of public respect for and confidence in the
60
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Id. at 815.
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Federal
judiciary, and to render him unfit to continue to serve as such
62
judge.
The import of the Ritter trial is emphasized by the fact that various Senators
filed written opinions explaining their vote. As Senator Key Pittman, who voted
to acquit on the first six articles, said:
I voted for article 7 because it contains a general charge that the judge,
by reason of his conduct in the various matters charged, has raised a substantial doubt as to the integrity of the judge and destroyed confidence in
such court and in the efficiency of the judge.6 3
Senators Borah, La Follette, Frazier and Shipstead stated in a joint opinion:
It is our view that a
shown that he is wanting
of his tenure of office by
want of "good behavior"

Federal judge may be removed from office if it is
in that "good behavior" designated as a condition
the Constitution although such acts as disclose his
may not amount to a crime.

... If a judge is guilty of such conduct as brings the court into disrepute,
he is not to be exempt from removal simply because his conduct does not
amount to a crime.
. . [Wje sought only to ascertain from these facts whether his conduct
had been such as to amount to misbehavior, misconduct-as to whether he
had conducted himself in a way that was calculated to undermine public
confidence in the courts and to create a sense of scandal.6 4 (Emphasis
added.)
*

Senator Elbert D. Thomas noted in his opinion that the standard of impeachable offenses of a federal judge is different from that of other civil officers.
This is due, he stated, to the fact that the judicial tenure of office is for life or
good behavior whereas other offices have a fixed time duration. The judicial
office is a public trust and the judge who abuses that trust must be removed."
This then is the congressional authority as to what constitutes an impeachable offense on the part of a federal judge. It amounts to an evolutionary adoption of the principle that a judge whose conduct casts doubt on the integrity of the
federal judiciary has committed an impeachable offense. It is a complete rejection of the notion that "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" which amount to
indictable crimes are the only standard of impeachment. Through the years,
Congress has interpreted article III, § 1, as providing either additional grounds
of impeachment or a definition of "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" as applied
to federal judges. Congress has recognized that federal judges must be held to a
different standard of conduct than other civil officers because of the nature of
their positions and the tenure of their offices. Congress has rejected impeachment
62
63
64
65

Id. at 34.
Id. at 644.
Id. at 644-45.
Id. at 646.
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as a method of removing those judges whose only "offense" is to render unpopular opinions in the course of their duties or espouse unpopular political
philosophies on or off the bench.
III. Analysis
A review of the paft impeachment proceedings has dearly established little
constitutional basis for thi argument that an impeachable offense must be indictable as well. If this were to be the case, the Constitution would then merely
provide an additional or alternate method of punishment, in specific instances,
to the traditional criminal law violator. If the framers had meant to remove from
office only those officials who violated the criminal 'law, a much simpler method
than impeachment could have been devised. Since impeachment is such a
complex and cumbersome procedure, it must have been directed at conduct
which would be outside the purview of the criminal law. Moreover, the traditionally accepted purpose of impeachment would seem to work against such a construction. By restricting the punishment for impeachment to removal and
disqualification from office, impeachment seems to be a protective, rather
than a punitive, device. It is meant to protect the public from conduct by
high public officials that undermines public confidence. Since that is the case, the
nature of impeachment must be broader than this argument would make it.
Much conduct on the part of a judge, while not criminal, would be detrimental
to the public welfare. Therefore it seems clear that impeachment will lie for conduct not indictable *nor even criminal in nature. It will be remembered that
Judge Archbald was removed from office for conduct which, in at least one comm
mentator's view, would have been blameless if done by a private citizen.
I
A sound approach to the constitutional provisions relating to the impeachment power appears to be that which was made during the impeachment of
Judge Archbald. Article I, §§ 2 and 3, give Congress jurisdiction to try impeachments. Article II, § 4,is a mandatory provision which requires removal of officials
convicted of "Treason, Bribery or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." The
latter phrase is meant to include conduct which, while not'indictable by the
criminal law, has at least the characteristics of a crime. However, this provision
is not conclusively restrictive. Congress may look elsewhere in the Constitution to
determine if an impeachable offense has occurred. In the case of judges, such
additional grounds of impeachment may be found in article III, § 1, where the
judicial tenure is fixed at "good Behaviour." Since good behavior is the limit of
the judicial tenure, some method of removal must be available where a judge
breaches that'condition of his office. That method is impeachment. Even though
this construction has been criticized by one write r as being logically fallacious,"7
it seems to be the construction adopted by the, Senate in the Archbald and Ritter
cases. Even Simpson, who criticized the approach, reaches 'the same result
because he argues that -'Misdemeanor" must, by definition, include misbehavior
in office.6 8
66 Brown, supra note 57.'
67 Simpson, Federal Impeachments, 64 U. PA. L. REv. 803,-806-08 (1916).
68 Id. at 812-13.
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In determining what constitutes impeachable judicial misbehavior, recourse
must be had to the previous impeachment proceedings. Those proceedings fall
mainly into two categories, misconduct in the actual administration of justice and
financial improprieties off the bench. Pickering was charged with holding court
while intoxicated and with mishandling cases. Chase and Peck were charged with
misconduct which was prejudicial to the impartial administration of justice and
with oppressive and corrupt use of their office to punish individuals critical of
their actions. Swayne, Archbald, Louderback and Ritter were all accused of
using their office for personal profit and with various types of financial indiscretions. English was impeached both for oppressive misconduct while on the bench
and for financial misdealings. The impeachment of Humphries is the only one
which does not fall within this pattern, and the charges brought against him
probably amounted to treason.69
While various definitions of impeachable misbehavior have been advanced,
the unifying factor in these definitions is the notion that there must be such misconduct as to cast doubt on the integrity and impartiality of the federal judiciary.
One author has defined that misbehavior as follows:
It must act directly or by reflected influence react upon the welfare of the
state. It may constitute an intentional violation of positive law, or it may be
an official dereliction of commission or omission, a serious breach of moral
obligation, or other gross impropriety of personal conduct which, in its
natural consequences, tends to bring an office into contempt and disrepute.
. . . An act or course of misbehavior which renders scandalous the
personal life of a public officer shakes the confidence of the people in his administration of the public affairs, and thus impairs his official usefulness.. .. 70
As another author stated with respect to the outcome of the Archbald impeachment:
[I]t determined that a judge ought not only be impartial, but he ought so to
demean himself, both in and out of court, that litigants will have no reason
to suspect his impartiality; and that repeatedly failing in that respect constitutes a "high misdemeanor" in regard to his office. If such be considered
the result of that case, everyone must agree that it established a much needed
precedent. 71
John W. Davis, House manager in the impeachment of Judge Archbald,
defined judicial misbehavior as follows:
Usurpation of power, the entering and enforcement of orders beyond
his jurisdiction, disregard or disobedience of the rulings of superior tribunals,
unblushing and notorious partiality and favoritism, indolence and neglectall are violations of his official oath ....

And it is easily possible to go

further and imagine.., such willingness to use his office to serve his personal
ends, as to be within reach of no branch of the criminal law, yet calculated
69 Brown, supra note 57, at 704.
70 Id. at 692-93. See also Ford, Impeachment -A
NOTRE DAME LAvrimR 669 (1971).
71 Simpson, supra note 67, at 813.
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with absolute certainty to bring the court into public
obloquy and contempt
72
and to seriously affect the administration of justice.
Representative Summers, one of the-managers in .the Louderback impeachment, gave this definition:
[W]hen the facts proven with reference to a respondent are such as are
reasonably calculated to arouse a substantial doubt in the minds of the people
over whom that respondent exercises authority, that he is not brave, candid,
honest, and true, there is no other alternative than to remove such a judge
from the
bench, because wherever doubt resides confidence cannot be
73
present.
IV. Conclusion
In conclusion, the history of the constitutional provisions relating to the
impeachment of federal judges demonstrates that only the Congress has the
power and duty to remove from office any judge whose proven conduct, either
in the administration of justice or in his personal behavior, casts doubt on his
personal integrity and thereby on the integrity of the entire judiciary. Federal
judges must maintain the highest standards of conduct to preserve the independence of and respect for the judicial system and the rule of law. As Representative
Summers stated during the Ritter impeachment: "When a judge on the bench,
by his own conduct, arouses a substantial doubt as to his judicial integrity he commits the highest crime that a judge can commit under the Constitution."74
Finally, the application of the principles of the impeachment process is left
solely to the Congress. There is no appeal from Congress' ultimate judgment.
Thus, it can fairly be said that it is the conscience of Congress-acting in accordance with the constitutional limitations-which determines whether conduct of a
judge constitutes misbehavior requiring impeachment and removal from office.
If a judge's misbehavior is so grave as to cast substantial doubt upon his integrity,
he must be removed from office regardless of all other considerations If a judge
has not abused his trust, Congress has the duty to reaffirm public trust and confidence in his actions.7"

72 49 CONG. REc. 1266 (1913).
73 LOUDERBACK PROCEEDINGS at 815.
74 RrrmER PROCEEDINGS at 611.
75 For an excellent discussion of Congress' role in the impeachment process, see Ford, Impeachment-A Mace for the Federal judiciary, 46 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 669 (1971).

